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Virtual Macedonia Bookstore - Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat
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List Price: $18.00
Our Price: $1.89
Your Save: $ 16.11 ( 90% )
Availability: Usually ships in 24 hours
Manufacturer: PublicAffairs
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Average Customer Rating:  
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Binding: Paperback
Dewey Decimal Number: 355
EAN: 9781586481391
ISBN: 1586481398
Label: PublicAffairs
Manufacturer: PublicAffairs
Number Of Items: 1
Number Of Pages: 512
Publication Date: 2002-08-09
Publisher: PublicAffairs
Release Date: 2002-08-06
Studio: PublicAffairs
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Spotlight customer reviews:
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Customer Rating:
Summary: Clark misunderstands modern war -- and his results prove it
Comment: Was eager to read an informed account on what went on in Bosnia and Kosovo from someone who was in the position to know and actually made many of the required decisions. I had thought that the seemingly inept handling of both operations was more lack of knowledge of what was actually occurring. I was surprised to find out that we knew more than I thought and the decision-making really was that inept. For instance, Clark defends bombing Kosovo from 10k feet because he was afraid to lose aircraft in a war. His view was that if we had no losses we could go on forever, whereas if we start taking losses we have a decreasing number of aircraft to use and will be forced at some point to stop. I guess that's true if there is no increased effectiveness for bombing at lower altitude -- but no one ever believed that. Clark was simply so averse to risk that he guaranteed that little could be accomplished. If a cause is not worth the risk, we should not embark on it and it was Clark's job to point that out to the President. I was surprised that Clark still missed that point so badly after the fact that he put the anecdote in the book without wishing he'd done things differently or explaining that the conditions looked different at the time. By his account they looked about as everyone saw them , but he didn't understand what was going on and apparently didn't ask his staff for a candid assessment. Good book if you want to learn what not to do. Not good if you want insights into future war.
Customer Rating:
Summary: Clark's Got it.
Comment: GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: (to U.S. Government) Gentlemen, there is a lot to do and very little time to do it, in order to prevent. .
GOV'T: Wait. Prevent? We don't Prevent things, General.
CLARK: Why the hell not?!
GOV'T: Because it would be too similar to admitting we were wrong during the Cold War.
CLARK: We were wrong a lot of the time during the Cold War.
GOV'T: You are so fired after you retire early in disgust of this administration. .
Customer Rating:
Summary: Insider account of the Balkans crisis
Comment: This book is formally an autobiography, but pays scant attention to the first 50 years or so of the author's life. Instead, Clark has written a strong account of his involvement in the two Yugoslav wars that took place in the 90s; first the Bosnia war, where he worked as a military adviser to Richard Holbrooke, and then his role as Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in the Kosovo war a few years later.
These two roles gave Clark insight into the interactions of the objecives, often quite distinct, of military and political leaders. This was particularly true of his work as SACEUR (NATO commander), where he was the focal point of that tension, reporting to the defense ministers and heads of state of the various nations while leading the various armed forces. He also has a good deal to say about the practical issues in integrating units from different countries in a single operation, along with the longstanding problems of integrating the capabilities of the traditionally rival American services. This was, for me, the most informative part of the book, and would certainly make it essential reading for any officer or diplomat interested in this topic.
Clark also has a good deal to say about the institutional problems he had in Washington and the Pentagon. The Pentagon leadership, in particular, hostile to the idea of fighting an enemy that wasn't in the Middle East or East Asia and even more hostile to the current President, undermined Clark repeatedly and then, when the war was successfully completed anyway, arranged for his reward to be getting fired.
The book was clearly actually written by Clark without use of a ghost. This isn't always an advantage - Clark lack's the professional writer's eye for the telling detail so instead sometimes gives us too many details that add up to too little information. But in the end, a book written by the actual actor in these events tells us more than a book written with a smoother style by a ghost.
Customer Rating:
Summary: Something to upset everyone
Comment: General (ret) Wesley Clark's recollections of events leading up to the 1999 bombing campaign against Serbia truly has something to upset or annoy everyone.
Before we go into the details of all the various fashions in which GEN Clark can make everyone unhappy, let us consider the context of the publication of this book. The book was published in 2001, shortly after he was fired for his performance as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), both the military commander of NATO and the senior U.S. military officer in Europe. At that point, it seems likely that he was already considering his attempt to run for the Presidency. And limiting what he could say would be (hopefully) a desire to continue to protect classified information that he was in possession of as a general in the U.S. military. So we see indications that this work could be a self-aggrandizing apologia with a gag-order.
The first thing that can upset folks. GEN Clark personally pressured, directly and indirectly, the U.S. to rush into a European war in the Balkans. A constant theme through the text is that both military and civil leaders (including President Clinton) were very reluctant to get the U.S. more deeply involved in the troubles in the Balkans, and very, very reluctant to enter another war. GEN Clark repeatedly appealed to them to use military power to force Serbia under Milosovic to change his internal policies. He also went to directly to the media with his message and through public opinion forced elected leaders and their appointed representatives to comply to his (GEN Clark's) intent. The other interpretation of this is that GEN Clark was the only American leader that *really* cared about the Kosovars and their plight at the hands of the Serbs.
The second thing that should upset people. GEN Clark never mentions any attempt to find out why the Serbs were conducting operations in Kosovo. If, at the very first allegation of violence in Kosovo, GEN Clark and the NATO leadership had made a concerted effort to find out why the Serbs were doing what they were doing, they would have found out that the Kosovo Liberation Army were terrorists and heroin smugglers. This suggests many approaches to resolving the conflict without resorting to a bombing campaign. The Serbs were demonized from the first moment that events bagan to unfold in Kosovo, and never offered a solution other than "stop that or we shoot".
The third thing to upset everyone: GEN Clark put European interests ahead of U.S. interests. GEN Clark relates that Javier Solana, Sec. Gen. of NATO, expressed that failure to act in Kosovo would jepordize the existence of NATO, and that this could not be allowed. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO has been floundering in search of relevance, and has evolved into more of an economic club than a true military defensive alliance. Ultimately, NATO is of much greater benefit to it's European members than the U.S. By supporting Solana's objectives, GEN Clark put NATO and European interests ahead of U.S. national security. The counter argument is that Europe's security is America's security, but with the competing interests and lack of agreement inside Europe, this argument is a sweeping generality, a great sound bite, but devoid of substance.
The fourth thing that should upset absolutely anyone: The bombing campaign was in its second month before NATO sat down and tryed to hash out what the objective, the goal, the desired outcome was. If an Army colonel were to begin a lower level operation (say with 2000-3000 soldiers) without a clear endstate, a concise discription of his/her desired outcome, that colonel would be relieved on the spot. If a four-star general begins an operation without a clear objective, a stated goal, well... GEN Clark seemed to take it for granted that this was OK.
On the other side of the ledger, the book is engaging and well written. The events are laid out chronologically and with enough detail to make it flow well. Despite the constant name dropping, the material was engaging and comprehensive. It also is an education into the inner workings of NATO, and the relationship between SACEUR, the Pentagon, and the President. It doesn't quite give a day by day description of the attack on Serbia, but would be an excellent resource for filling in the blanks behind a dry, academic history of the conflict. This will be an essential work for future historians of the post-Yugoslavia Balkans.
Customer Rating:
Summary: If you have to read this book, buy it used and save some $
Comment: This is not a book, but a rambling memoir filled with too many personal comments of little substance. Do not expect an objective analysis as to the causes or the events surrounding the Kosovo conflict. Nor expect a CLEAR or INSIGHTFUL book on how military decisions are made and executed.
Any value this book may have had in describing the decision making process between the US military and its political leadership was buried in the almost constant self complementary remarks.
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Editorial Reviews:
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This memoir from the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, now revised and updated, offers a unique behind-the-scenes look at how war is fought today. In Waging Modern War, General Wesley K. Clark recounts his experience leading NATO's forces to a hard-fought and ultimately successful victory in Kosovo in 1999. As the American military machine has swung into action in the months following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, it has become clear that the lessons of Kosovo are directly applicable to the war against terrorism and the nations that sponsor it. The problems posed, and overcome, in the war in Kosovo--how to fight an air war against unconventional forces in rough terrain and how to coordinate U.S. objectives with those of other nations--are the problems that America increasingly faces in the today's world. As the Los Angeles Times noted in late September of 2001, this book's "lessons are highly relevant now.... We need to think about exactly what steps will lessen, rather than increase, the terrorist threat. And we also need innovative commanders willing to improvise to meet a new kind of threat, more determined political leadership, a more flexible outlook in the Pentagon.... Gen. Clark has performed another service by highlighting these problems at a crucial moment in American history. " Waging Modern War is history, memoir, guidebook, and forecast, essential reading for those who want to know how modern war is fought, and won.
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